Establishing historical Events "under a Description"

Resumen

This article argues that historical events exist only “under a description,” shaped by the interpretive frameworks and narrative purposes of historians rather than as self-contained entities waiting to be discovered. Confronting the persistent intuition that events must have an independent existence, it critiques essentialist views and demonstrates that events are constructed through the selective organization of facts into accounts serving specific explanatory aims. Unlike debates in philosophy of language, historical construction is less about reference and more about constructing meaningful connections. The article also critiques the reliance on causal explanations, revealing their limited value in capturing the complexities of past phenomena, and instead underscores the role of linguistic and historiographical practices in giving events their coherence and significance. By distinguishing between the factual accuracy of individual elements and the broader validity of historical interpretations, it emphasizes the contingent, evaluative, and constructed nature of historical representation. Ultimately, this approach calls for an understanding of history-writing as a dynamic practice of meaning-making—one grounded in evidence, but also in the recognition of its limits, its ethical stakes, and its power to shape collective memory and identity.